Form as Formalization by Lawsky, Sarah
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FORM AS FORMALIZATION 
 
SARAH LAWSKY* 
 
CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION .............................................................. 115	
II.  TAX PREPARATION SOFTWARE, TAX FORMS, AND 
THE LAW .......................................................................... 117 
III.  AN EXAMPLE: PERSONAL CASUALTY LOSSES .......... 125 
IV.  NEXT STEPS: FLEXIBLE FORMS, CODED LAW ......... 144 
V.  CONCLUSION .................................................................. 151 
VI.  APPENDICES ................................................................... 152 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Benjamin Mazur Summer Research Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. 
Thanks to Joseph Blass, Neil Buchanan, Erin Delaney, Stephanie Hoffer, Amy Post, Larry 
Zelenak, and participants in the Spring 2019 Duke Tax Policy Colloquium, the Spring 2019 
Charles H. Gershenson Faculty Workshop Series at Wayne State University Law School, and 
the Spring 2019 Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Faculty Colloquium for helpful 
discussions and comments. Thanks also to Julia Rolniak for excellent research assistance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Ohio State Technology Law Journal 
 
2020] LAWSKY 115 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There are, roughly speaking, two approaches to applying computing to 
law, which can be thought of as a bottom-up approach and a top-down 
approach. The bottom-up approach uses large amounts of data in some 
way—to make predictions, for example. Machine learning techniques 
such as neural nets embody this approach. This is generally seen to be 
the approach with the most potential, the one that leads to the ‘data 
driven future’1 of legal practice. The top-down approach would derive 
conclusions from the law itself, after making the law legible to the 
computer in some way, perhaps through hand-encoding, perhaps by 
using natural language processing or some similar approach to permit 
the computer to ‘read’ the actual text of a statute or regulation.  
 
The top-down approach, also sometimes called computational law, is 
generally considered to have much less potential.2 But even those who 
dismiss computational law point to one example of success in 
encoding the law: TurboTax and similar tax compliance programs. 
Thus one finds enthusiastic references to creating “TurboTax for 
police complaints,”3 “TurboTax for copyright,”4 “TurboTax for 
immigration,”5 and so forth. 
 
 
 
 
1 See Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—or—How I Learned to Stop 
Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 
EMORY L.J. 909 (2013). 
2 Id. 
3 Cynthia H. Conti-Cook, Open Data Policing, 106 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 18 (2017) (describing 
a website “designed like TurboTax for police complaints” that “publish[es] the complaint as 
the subject decides, with non-governmental actors, the press, or local civil rights attorneys”). 
4 Lorelei Laird, Two Reluctant Entrepreneurs Turn the Challenge of Copyright Duration into 
a Business, 102-May ABA J. 54 (2016), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/two_reluctant_entrepreneurs_tackle_the_challen
ge_of_copyright_duration_into (describing a program, Durationator, that “takes basic 
information about a work and determines its copyright status in any country in the world” and 
“looks like TurboTax for copyright”). 
5 Robert Schoon, TurboTax for Immigration Paperwork: Clearpath’s Latino CEO Seeks to 
Make the Process Easier, LATIN POST, (Jan. 29, 2014, 5:11 PM), 
http://www.latinpost.com/articles/6585/20140129/turbotax-for-immigration-paperwork-
clearpaths-latino-ceo-seeks-to-make-the-process-easier.htm [https://perma.cc/SNC8-R67G] 
(“Similar to the consumer-minded TurboTax system, a software style often called a ‘wizard,’ 
Clearpath asks users simple questions online to analyze what they're trying to achieve. It then 
brings up the right immigration forms and inputs users' answers, with the goal of saving time, 
money, and frustration in the process.”). 
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J.B. Ruhl and Daniel Martin Katz argue: 
 
 Tax software companies are essentially selling the simplification of 
the Tax Code for the user, yet they must provide a product that 
accurately calculates the user’s tax liability under any scenario and 
thus must somehow pack all of the Tax Code’s substance into the 
software program. … If the software is too complex, for example, 
it may be very difficult to update the program as Congress changes 
the Tax Code, as a change in one provision cascades in effect to 
other provisions. It would be in a tax software company’s interests, 
therefore, to develop a program that is no more complex than 
needed to produce accurate user tax liability calculations. Perhaps 
a good measure of Tax Code complexity would then be the 
complexity of reliable tax compliance software.6 
 
Such characterizations of TurboTax and other similar programs are 
incorrect. Tax preparation programs do not encode the law. Rather, as 
this paper argues, these programs encode the tax forms, which are not 
law, and which are prepared by the government itself. The difficult 
part of the coding, and the judgment calls, are almost entirely 
performed by the government, not by those who code tax preparation 
software. Tax forms are extraordinary in that they are designed so that 
people who do not know or understand the law can still comply with 
the law. Indeed, people may have absolutely no idea why they are 
filling out certain lines, or what the legal implications of those lines 
are. Yet they do fill out the forms, and thus they do comply with the 
law. Tax preparation programs do not simplify the law, because tax 
forms do not simplify the law. Rather, tax forms collect information 
and turn portions of the law into an algorithm for taxpayers to apply. 
And because forms turn law into algorithms, the forms themselves—
not the instructions, but the actual forms, the actual way that entries 
are set to interact with each other—may contain judgments about the 
law, sometimes law that is unclear. 
 
 
 
 
 
6 J.B. Ruhl & Daniel Martin Katz, Measuring, Monitoring, and Measuring Legal Complexity, 
101 IOWA L. REV 191, 196 (2015). 
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This paper examines tax forms to learn more about how coding law 
can be beneficial. Part II investigates the relationship among forms, tax 
preparation software, and the law, and introduces the elements of a 
form: inputs, outputs, and algorithms. Part III uses the casualty loss 
rules for individuals, and the recent change in those rules, as an 
example of the implementation of law through tax forms, and provides 
an example of a form’s structure resolving an ambiguity in a statute. 
Part IV suggests some possible next steps, including creating more-
flexible tax forms and formalizing the law itself. Part V concludes. 
 
II. Tax Preparation Software, Tax Forms, and the Law 
 
a. Tax Preparation Software 
 
Tax preparation software is often presented as an example of top-down 
computational law. For example, Michael Genesereth, a computer 
science professor, the founder and research director of Stanford’s 
CodeX Center for Legal Informatics, and a leader in the field of 
computational law, writes: “Intuit’s Turbotax is a simple example of a 
rudimentary Computational Law system. Millions use it each year to 
prepare their tax forms. Based on values supplied by its user, it 
automatically computes the user’s tax obligations and fills in the 
appropriate tax forms.”7 Computational law, he explains, is based on 
“Computational Logic,” which “represent[s] facts and regulations as 
sentences in formal logic” and “use[s] mechanical reasoning 
techniques to derive consequences of the facts and laws so 
represented.”8 It is highly unlikely that this accurately describes how 
TurboTax works, for a number of reasons. 
 
First, tax preparation software was first developed in the mid-1980s, 
and use of the software rose precipitously through the 1990s.9 By 
1991, approximately 25 million individual returns were prepared using 
 
 
 
 
7 Michael Genesereth, Computational Law: The Cop in the Backseat (2015) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://complaw.stanford.edu/complaw/readings/complaw.pdf.      
8 Id. 
9 Rodney Mock & Nancy E. Shurtz, The TurboTax Defense, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 443, 445 
(2014). 
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tax preparation software.10 (This is to be distinguished from electronic 
filing.) By 2002, nearly 47 million returns were filed electronically, 
some by individuals and some by practitioners.11 (Presumably even 
more returns were being prepared electronically.) Given this timeline, 
it is highly unlikely, if not impossible, that tax preparation software 
encodes the actual tax law. In the mid-1980s (and arguably even 
today), it was simply not possible that tax preparation software could 
have put anything other than the forms on the computer.12 
 
Second, and perhaps even more compelling, the purpose of tax 
preparation software is, as one might expect, to prepare tax forms. 
Preparing the forms by encoding the actual law and then deriving the 
apparently correct results from that encoding would involve an 
extraordinary amount of unnecessary, and probably harmful, work. 
The goal of the tax preparation programs is to fill in blanks on the 
forms that are submitted to the government. As this article shows, the 
forms themselves abstract away from the law. It is entirely unclear 
why tax preparation companies would do anything other than track the 
forms. 
 
To be clear, tax preparation software companies do not claim to have 
formalized or coded the Internal Revenue Code and accompanying 
regulations. Intuit, for example, which makes TurboTax, discloses in 
its SEC filings that it provides programs to aid with “tax 
preparation.”13 Risks facing the Intuit business model thus include 
federal or state government’s becoming involved in preparing returns, 
 
 
 
 
10 Robert E. Nelson & Joseph W. Langer, Preparation Software Increasingly Tied to 
Electronic Filing, 75 J. TAX’N 294, 294 (1991) (some of these were prepared directly by 
taxpayers, while others were prepared by tax practitioners). 
11 Table 4 – Number of Individual Income Tax Returns Filed Electronically and Accepted, by 
State, Fiscal Year 2002, I.R.S. (FY 2002), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02db04nr.xls.  
12 To bring home even further that Intuit is in the business of tax return preparation, not tax 
law formalization, on January 2, 2019, when the 2018 tax form for casualty losses had not yet 
been released, attempting to enter casualty loss information in TurboTax resulted in this 
message: “The Casualties and Thefts Area Will Be Ready Soon. You’ve done a great job 
starting your taxes early, but the IRS is still working on finishing up the casualties and thefts 
area (Form 4684) for 2018. That means this area isn't quite ready yet. . . . We'll let you know 
when the form is ready, and help you finish your return. We expect this form to be ready for 
you on 01/25/2019” (printout on file with author).  
13 INTUIT, INC., FORM 10-Q 9 (2019).      
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thus freeing users from reliance on the private tax software.14 
Similarly, Deloitte, one of the largest accounting firms, does see the 
promise of artificial intelligence, but not, at least as described in its 
public documents, top-down artificial intelligence. Rather, Deloitte has 
described using large amounts of data to train computers to ask and 
respond to relevant questions from consumers.15 And attempts to use 
natural language processing to make the tax code legible to machines 
have not been successful, due in part to the complexity of the language 
of the tax code.16 
 
All of this strongly suggests that tax preparation software encodes 
forms, not statutes or regulations.17 Tax preparation software can 
nonetheless add value in many ways. For example, the software can 
use answers to questions it poses to decide which forms are relevant. 
Tax preparation software can lead people through forms, just as 
software ‘wizards’ lead people through the steps to, for example, set 
up computer programs. The software can use machine learning and 
other big-data techniques to help taxpayers resolve questions related to 
 
 
 
 
14 Id. at 42. Risks do also include “the need to incorporate unpredictable and potentially late 
tax law and tax form changes each year and because our customers expect high levels of 
accuracy and a timely launch of these products to prepare and file their taxes by the tax filing 
deadline. Due to the complexity of our products and the condensed development cycles under 
which we operate, our products may contain errors that could unexpectedly interfere with the 
operation of the software or result in incorrect calculations. The complexity of the tax laws on 
which our products are based may also make it difficult for us to consistently deliver offerings 
that contain the features, functionality and level of accuracy that our customers expect.” Id. at 
48. 
15 E.g., DELOITTE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE—ENTERING THE WORLD OF TAX (2019), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-artificial-
intelligence-in-tax.pdf.  
16 See, e.g., Bjarne Berg, Machine Learning (ML) in US Tax Regulations, PWC: TAX RES. & 
INSIGHTS (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/tax/tax-technology-
blogs/machine-learning-in-tax.html [https://perma.cc/K3JC-CPMK] (failing to use natural 
language processing to capture the US tax code and regulations); Marcos Pertierra, Sarah 
Lawsky, Erik Hemberg, & Una-May O’Reilly, TOWARDS FORMALIZING STATUTE LAW AS 
DEFAULT LOGIC THROUGH AUTOMATIC SEMANTIC PARSING, MIT COMPUTER SCI. & ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE LAB (July 2017), http://groups.csail.mit.edu/EVO-
DesignOpt/groupWebSite/uploads/Site/ASAIL_2017_Pertierra.pdf (proceedings of Second 
Workshop on Automated Detection, Extraction and Analysis of Semantic Information in Legal 
Texts (ASAIL)) (failing to use natural language processing to extract rules from a particular 
section of the Internal Revenue Code). 
17 Repeated attempts to have actual tax preparation companies confirm this supposition have 
not been successful. 
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ambiguous inputs.18 Some software purports, for better or for worse, to 
be able to assess a user’s audit risk.19 And the software can implement 
the actual calculations required by the form, in the order in which the 
form requires them. But the value tax preparation programs provide is 
almost certainly not derived from coding the actual statutory and 
regulatory law. 
 
b. Tax Forms 
 
The balance of this paper assumes that tax preparation programs do in 
fact follow tax forms, rather than the law directly. These programs are 
then not encoding the law, because tax forms are not law. The status of 
instructions is clear: a taxpayer cannot rely on the instructions to tax 
forms to defend particular legal positions.20 Indeed, one judge has 
suggested that taxpayers cannot even rely on IRS publications, of 
which instructions are one type, to avoid penalties.21 Forms are distinct 
from instructions. One court, for example, has distinguished between 
what is requested on the “face” of a form, and what is requested in the 
instructions for that form.22 But the same reasoning that denies 
 
 
 
 
18 See infra B.1. 
19 For example, TurboTax’s “audit meter” “gives you a visual indication of your possible audit 
risk.” About the Audit Risk Meter, INTUIT, INC., https://ttlc.intuit.com/questions/1900711-
about-the-audit-risk-meter [https://perma.cc/S5CL-EXXZ]. The problem, of course, is that the 
audit meter can suggest to taxpayers that they should make their return more conservation, but 
it might also suggest to taxpayers that, depending on the taxpayer’s appetite for risk, there 
room for some more favorable treatment without triggering an audit. The stoplight-like 
coloring of the audit meter, running from green, low risk, through yellow, to red, high risk, is 
particularly suggestive.  
20 E.g., Dashiell C. Shapiro, Can Taxpayers Rely on IRS Form Instructions?, TAX NOTES 945 
(2015) (citing many cases in which courts refused to permit taxpayers to rely on instructions); 
see also Wilkes v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1287 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (noting that 
instructions on a form are “generally consistent with Plaintiff’s reading of the statutes . . . [but] 
they are not of such moment as to be dispositive”). 
21 Order, Bobrow v. Comm’r, 2014 ARD 079-1 (Nega, J.), refusing to reconsider Bobrow v. 
Comm’r, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1110 (2014) (“[T]axpayers rely on IRS guidance at their own 
peril . . . . [H]ad petitioners argued reliance on Publication 590 in their briefs, such an 
argument would not have served as substantial authority for the position taken on their tax 
returns [and thus could not mitigate a section 6662 accuracy-related penalty].”). 
22 Estate of Merwin v. Comm’r, 95 T.C. 168, 180-81 (1990). I was able to find only example 
of an actual error on a tax form’s algorithm—not in the form structure itself, but in the 
requested inputs. In 1982, Line 1 of the Schedule Q to Form 706 initially read, “Transferee’s 
tax as apportioned (from worksheet, (line 7 / line 8) X line 34 for each column).” It should 
have read “Transferee’s tax as apportioned (from worksheet, (line 7 / line 8) X line 35 for each 
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instructions the status of law should treat the form the same way. 
Forms themselves are not statutes or regulations. 
  
Forms themselves are, rather, a formalization of the law, because they 
translate the law into a series of automatic steps applied to taxpayer-
supplied inputs.23 As formalizations, they are not simplifications of the 
law, as are some instructions.24 This may seem a strange claim. 
Consider, for example, the Form 1040-EZ. Form 1040-EZ calculated 
individual income tax liability and was a mere 14 lines long. 25 But it 
was not a simplification of the law. Rather, the form was a precise 
implementation of the law for the people who were permitted to use 
Form 1040-EZ. Part of the implementation of the law was limiting the 
use of Form 1040-EZ to those for whom it was not a simplification: 
people who were single or married filing jointly, younger than 65, had 
no dependents, had income below $100,000, and so forth.26 
 
column).” The IRS initially issued the form in June 1982, discovered the error in September 
1982, and corrected the error in November 1982. Announcement 82-141, 1982-44 IRB 15. 
This error cost at least one taxpayer a significant amount of money, reducing a credit from 
$104,350 to $35,562. The return preparer apparently did not see the correction when she 
prepared the form, even though a copy of the notice correcting the form was placed in each 
form. See Boryan v. United States, 690 F. Supp. 459 (ED Va. 1988). The court held that the 
taxpayer could not receive a higher refund, notwithstanding that the error was due to the 
incorrect form. The statute of limitations had already run, and the equities did not, the court 
held, weigh particularly heavily in favor of the taxpayer, because the notice of correction was 
issued five months before the return was filed; the form was permanently corrected within the 
statute of limitations; and familiarity with the statute should have suggested that the credit was 
approximately one-third of the correct amount. Id. at 467. 
23 For a discussion of the benefits of the formalization of tax law, see generally Sarah B. 
Lawsky, Formalizing the Code, 70 TAX L. REV. 377 (2017). 
24 See, e.g., Joshua D. Blank & Leigh Osofsky, Simplexity: Plain Language and the Tax Law, 
66 EMORY L.J. 189, 207-14 (2017) (presenting examples of instructions’ presenting contested 
law as clear and omitting possible exceptions). 
25 As of tax year 2018, the 1040-EZ is no longer with us, having been replaced by the 
redesigned Form 1040. About Form 1040-EZ, Income Tax Return for Single and Joint Filers 
With No Dependents, I.R.S., https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1040-ez 
[https://perma.cc/NTJ9-6JVT] (last updated March 26, 2019). 
26 The list of requirements was long. People were able to use the form only if they met the 
following requirements: single or married filing jointly; under age 65 and not blind at the end 
of the tax year; do not claim any dependents; taxable income of less than $100,000; no 
adjustments to income; claimed no tax credit except the earned income credit; had only 
“wages, salaries, tips, taxable scholarship or fellowship grants, unemployment compensation, 
or Alaska Permanent Fund dividends, and . . . taxable interest . . . not over $1,500,” and some 
people who earned tips were still not able to use the form; and not claiming an increased 
standard deduction due to casualty loss related to property in a Presidentially declared disaster 
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Forms have three components: inputs, outputs, and algorithms. The 
algorithms transform the taxpayer-provided inputs into outputs. Tax 
forms are unusual among most governmental forms because of their 
relatively high ratio of outputs to inputs and the relative complexity of 
the calculations required. This is why computer preparation was a 
natural fit for tax forms even in the mid-1980s, as opposed to other 
forms. Other forms—immigration forms, for example—primarily 
collect and organize information. Tax forms, however, do things with 
numbers. Computing thus added value even in the very early days of 
spreadsheets. 
 
To take a fictional example, imagine that the entire tax statute 
consisted of the following: “Income includes income from whatever 
source derived. Taxable income means the excess, if any, of income 
over trade and business expenses.” The form could be implemented as 
follows: 
 
 
 
In this form, lines 1 and 2 are inputs, line 3 is an output, and the 
command in line 3 to either enter the difference between lines 1 and 2 
or to enter zero is the algorithm. The ways that inputs are combined 
could also be called the “form structure.” 
 
What does this imaginary form show? First, what should be input into 
the form may be ambiguous. Inputs may require defining a particular 
term that is difficult to define precisely. For example, Form 1040 lists 
various types of specific income and then requires the taxpayer to 
 
area. I.R.S., Dep’t of the Treasury, CAT. NO. 12063Z, 1040 EZ INSTRUCTIONS 2017 6, 7 
(2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i1040ez--2017.pdf. 
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include “Other Income,” listing type and amount.27 “Income” is a 
classic example of a term that is not clearly defined in the tax law.28 
 
Similarly, in our simple example form, the inputs are problematic. The 
meaning of “income” is unclear. Further, it is not clear what 
constitutes a “trade or business expense.” Perhaps the regulations or 
instructions in this imaginary world would attempt to expand upon the 
terms. Indeed, much could be said about what goes into lines 1 and 2.  
Second, tax law’s aversion to negative numbers29 means that even the 
simple rule in our imaginary statute is not completely straightforward 
to implement. After all, it would not be correct to say, for line 3, 
“Subtract line 2 from line 1 and enter the result,” because this could 
result in negative taxable income. The language in the imaginary form 
for implementing the algorithm tracks the IRS’s usual approach to 
dealing with implementing language such as “the excess (if any) of A 
over B.”30 
 
Third, what should be input into forms may be ambiguous, but once 
the information is input, implementing a form’s algorithm is 
 
 
 
 
27 I.R.S., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, CAT. NO. 71478F, SCHEDULE 1 (FORM 1040) (FY 2018), 
HTTPS://WWW.IRS.GOV/PUB/IRS-PDF/F1040S1.PDF. 
28 See generally Alice Abreu & Richard Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 295, 
299 (2011) (noting the “widespread uncertainty and disagreement about what counts as the 
kind of ‘accession to wealth’ that should be taxed—that is, widespread uncertainty and 
disagreement about what the language in the Internal Revenue Code and Glenshaw Glass 
means”).  
29 E.g., Eric A. Lustig, Negative Basis Reconsidered, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 45, 46 (1997) 
(discussing the “aversion” of Congress and the IRS to negative numbers in the context of tax 
law); Lee A. Sheppard, Reading Section 357(c) Out of the Code, 47 TAX NOTES 1556, 1557 
(1990) (noting that Congress “abhor[s]” the idea of a negative basis).  
30 If one were coding such language one could write MAX((A – B), 0), indicating that one 
should enter the maximum of (a) the difference between A and B and (b) zero, or, put another 
way, one should enter A – B if the result is a positive number and zero if A – B is zero or 
negative. Technically, one has to tell the computer what to do to implement MAX(X, Y) if X 
= Y. The instructions might be, for example, “Return X if X > Y and return Y otherwise,” 
which will return Y when X = Y. This shows up in Section 168(b)(1), which implements 
depreciation for certain property as “the 200 percent declining balance method, switching to 
the straight line method for the 1st taxable year for which using the straight line method with 
respect to the adjusted basis as of the beginning of the year will yield a larger allowance.” 
I.R.C. § 168(b)(1) (2017). There will always be a year when the allowance for the 200 percent 
declining balance method and the straight line method are the same, but the rule does prescribe 
what to do—specifically, use the 200 percent declining balance method. Id. 
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straightforward. In the imaginary form, once you have the inputs for 
lines 1 and 2, what to do with those inputs is not ambiguous, and 
results in a third number, the output, the taxable income. The tax law 
isn’t as simple as the imaginary tax law, and seeing that forms can, by 
form structure, implement rules even when the inputs the algorithm 
uses are genuinely ambiguous terms is another way of seeing the 
obvious point that forms are useful even in the face of genuine 
ambiguity. (By form structure, I mean the parts of a form itself other 
than the inputs. For example, how are the inputs combined? In what 
order do these combinations happen?) 
 
More generally, there are two kinds of answers to questions raised by a 
statute: answers that are usefully represented by a form structure, and 
answers that are not usefully represented by a form structure. These 
two categories do not map cleanly onto rules and standards, in the 
classic sense.31 Only certain kinds of questions or ambiguities can be 
resolved by form structure. The only thing that can be concluded is 
that if an answer is usefully resolvable by a form structure, the answer 
must be a rule (because form structure can implement only rules). But 
this does not mean that the only possible answer to the question is a 
rule; the question might also be resolvable by a standard (though in 
that case, the resolution could not be implemented by a form). I 
suspect there is no question that cannot be answered with a rule 
(though not all questions can be answered well with a rule), and not all 
rules will be usefully represented by a form structure. 
 
Finally, beyond what this imaginary form can teach us, an algorithm 
can implement only a rule. Because the algorithm is automatic, the 
link between the algorithm and the law may not be straightforward. In 
particular, the algorithm itself may resolve ambiguity in the law. 
Inputs leave room for ambiguity. The algorithms imposed by a form 
and the structure of a form do not. Once a form has its inputs, the 
answer is fixed. But the structure of the form may itself be resolving 
gaps, ambiguities, or misstatements in the statute. 
 
 
 
 
 
31 See generally, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L. REV. 557 (1992). 
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It is completely obvious that statutes raise questions that must be 
resolved by other lawmakers. Statutes, often by design, include gaps 
and ambiguities.32 These gaps and ambiguities are resolved by courts, 
regulations, and, in the tax context, other guidance such as notices and 
rulings. It has also been recognized that the instructions of tax forms 
sometimes purport to resolve ambiguities in the law, sometimes in 
favor of the government, sometimes in favor of the taxpayer.33 
Instructions are, as others have noted, not law. If an ambiguity is not 
satisfactorily resolved by the form instructions, or if a taxpayer 
disagrees with the form instructions, one would know that the question 
was not satisfactorily resolved, or was resolved in an objectionable 
way. 
 
The resolutions of questions by form structure are less obvious. If a 
taxpayer disagrees with the IRS’s position on an ambiguity related to 
an input, he will probably know that he disagrees (for example, he may 
read the instructions, understand that the instructions are only 
aspirational on the part of the IRS, and decide not to follow them), but 
can still use the form. He will enter an input that later he may have to 
defend in an audit, or in court. But given that input, the outputs of the 
form will follow the IRS’s position (and will be correct as a matter of 
law, assuming that the IRS’s position is correct as a matter of law). In 
contrast, if a taxpayer disagrees with an ambiguity that is resolved by 
form structure, he will simply not be able to use that form. 
 
III. An Example: Personal Casualty Losses 
 
These abstract ideas are best seen in the context of an actual statute 
and an actual form. This section first lays out the law with regard to 
the deduction of casualty gains and losses, and then shows how that 
complex law is digested into Form 4684, Casualties and Thefts.34 
 
 
 
 
32 See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality 
Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 
627, 628 (2002); Nicholas Quinn Rosencranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2155 (2002); Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and 
the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 867 (2014). 
33 Blank & Osofsky, supra note 25, at 194. 
34 Section 165(h) was not added until March 31, 1962, and applied to disaster losses after 
December 31, 1961. Act of March 31, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-426, § 2, 76 Stat. 51 (amending 
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a. The Law: Section 165(h) 
 
The Internal Revenue Code states as its general rule regarding losses 
that a deduction is permitted for any loss, to the extent not 
compensated for by insurance.35 In a perhaps surprising twist, 
however, given this general rule, losses of individuals are not 
deductible.36 An exception to the exception is provided for casualty 
losses: individuals may deduct losses that arise from “fire, storm, 
shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.”37 The deduction for 
casualty losses is limited by Section 165(h).38 A taxpayer can incur 
gains from a casualty, “personal casualty gains,”39 when the amount 
received due to the involuntary conversion of property due to a 
casualty exceeds the taxpayer’s basis in the property.  
 
The text of the statute states a number of rules clearly, including the 
following: 
 
(1) Personal casualty losses are permitted to be deducted only to 
the extent they exceed $100. This is per casualty, not per 
item.40 Call this the ‘$100 haircut.’ 
(2) Personal casualty losses are deducted above the line to the 
extent of casualty gains.41 Personal casualty losses in excess of 
personal casualty gains are deducted below the line, if the 
taxpayer itemizes deductions. 
 
internal revenue code with respect to treatment of casualty losses in Presidentially designated 
disaster areas). Something like current Section 165(h) was not added until September 3, 1982 
(prior to that time, 165(h) dealt only with disaster loss). Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility 
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 203(a), 96 Stat. 422 (adding the 10% of AGI rule). 
35 I.R.C. § 165(a) (2017). 
36 I.R.C. § 165(c) (2017). 
37 I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (2017). 
38 The limiting language is reproduced in full in Appendix A, and it is worth at least glancing 
at this language to appreciate its complexity and its at least initial obscurity. This section of 
the paper discusses the pre-2018 law related to casualty losses; the new law is discussed in a 
later section. 
39 I.R.C. § 165(h)(3)(A) (2017). 
40 I.R.C. § 165(h)(1) (2017). 
41 I.R.C. § 165(h)(4)(A) (2017). 
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(3) Personal casualty losses are permitted to the extent of personal 
casualty gains dollar for dollar.42 Personal casualty losses in 
excess of personal casualty gains are permitted only to the 
extent they exceed 10% of the individual’s AGI.43 Call this the 
‘AGI haircut.’ This is total casualty losses, not casualty by 
casualty, or item by item. 
(4) If the taxpayer is covered by insurance, a casualty loss is 
available only if the individual files a timely insurance claim.44 
 
Some questions that arise naturally from these rules are resolved 
directly and explicitly by the statute. For example, one might wonder 
whether the $100 haircut or the 10% AGI haircut is applied first. The 
statute addresses this directly: “personal casualty loss” for purposes of 
paragraph (2), the AGI haircut, is determined after the application of 
paragraph (1), the $100 haircut.45 
 
Other questions are resolved by the plain language of the text, 
although not explicitly. For example, does the $100 haircut also apply 
if there are not casualty losses in excess of casualty gains? That is, if 
the only role of the casualty losses is to offset casualty gains, will all 
the casualty losses be permitted to offset the casualty gains, or must 
the casualty losses be reduced by the casualty gains? This is not 
explicitly addressed by the statute, but from the plain language of the 
statute it appears that the $100 loss applies first: “Any loss… 
described in subsection (c)(3) shall be allowed only to the extent that 
the amount of the loss … exceeds … $100.”46 And “personal casualty 
loss” is defined as “any loss described in subsection (c)(3).”47 One can 
imagine this as a $100 deductible that applies to any casualty loss 
deduction. 
 
Yet other questions are not addressed by the statute, but are addressed 
in the regulations. The statute does not define personal casualty loss 
 
 
 
 
42 I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(A)(i) (2017). 
43 I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(A)(ii) (2017). 
44 I.R.C. § 165(h)(4)(E) (2017). 
45 I.R.C. § 165(h)(3)(B) (2017). 
46 I.R.C. § 165(h)(1) (2017). 
47 I.R.C. § 165(h)(3)(B) (2017). 
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beyond “loss described in subsection (c)(3),”48 and Section 165(c)(3) 
refers simply to losses arising from casualty, etc. The regulations fill in 
the details: the amount of the casualty loss is the lesser of (1) the fair 
market value of the property before the casualty less the fair market 
value of the property after the casualty, or (2) the basis of the 
property.49 Put another way, a tax loss is available for destruction of 
property only to the extent one has invested appropriately taxed dollars 
in that property, but no matter how many appropriately taxed dollars 
one has invested, one’s tax loss cannot be more than one’s economic 
loss. 
 
Finally, and of most interest for our purposes, other questions are 
addressed by neither statute nor regulation. For example, what is a 
casualty? More technical questions also lurk in the statute. For 
example, what is the result when insurance received is less than the 
basis of the property but greater than the economic loss due to the 
casualty? This last is perhaps a non-obvious question, so some 
explanation is in order.  
 
As already described, casualty gain is ‘recognized gain’ from a 
casualty. ‘Gain’ is the excess of the amount received over basis.50 So if 
the insurance received is greater than the basis, there is casualty gain. 
Casualty loss is the lesser of the economic loss and the basis, but only 
to the extent not offset by insurance received. If the insurance received 
is less than both the economic loss and the basis, then there is casualty 
loss, equal to the lesser of the economic loss or the basis, minus the 
insurance received.  
 
But is there a casualty gain, a casualty loss, or neither if the insurance 
received is less than the basis (so there is not casualty gain), but 
greater than the economic loss? This is addressed nowhere in the 
statute or in any binding guidance from the IRS. An IRS publication 
regarding casualty losses states that there is no casualty gain or 
casualty loss: 
 
 
 
 
48 Id. 
49 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(1) (1977). 
50 I.R.C. § 1001 (2017). 
2020] LAWSKY 129 
 
 
 
 The mere fact that the insurance proceeds exceed the cost of 
repairs does not in and of itself result in taxable income to the 
taxpayer. Any gain from a casualty is determined by the 
amount of insurance proceeds and any other form of 
compensation received or expected to be received in excess of 
the amount of the taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the damaged 
property prior to the casualty. In this example, the taxpayer 
would not recognize any gain because the amount of the 
insurance proceeds is less than the taxpayer’s pre-disaster basis 
in the residence.51 
 
This is indeed the answer that makes sense. Consider the question 
another way: if property is completely destroyed, and the basis prior to 
the casualty is greater than the economic loss due to the casualty, then 
loss property has been destroyed:  
 
Basis > Value Before – Value After 
Basis > Value Before – 0 
Value Before – Basis < 0 
 
But the casualty loss rules are constructed so that any loss incurred that 
isn’t due to the casualty is not deductible. 
 
Put another way, if the property had been sold instead of destroyed by 
a casualty, a loss would have been realized, but could not have been 
recognized, because personal losses are generally not recognized 
unless an exception applies. A taxpayer does not get to deduct that 
portion of the loss just because the property was destroyed in a 
casualty. So the taxpayer will deduct any portion of the loss due to the 
casualty, but not the portion due to the property’s having lost value 
before the property was destroyed. 
 
 
 
 
 
51 FAQS FOR DISASTER VICTIMS – CASUALTY LOSS, I.R.S., 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/faqs-for-disaster-victims-
casualty-loss-valuations-and-sections-165-i [https://perma.cc/TYK3-WWFC] (last updated 
July 29, 20197) . 
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Now imagine that insurance is received. If the amount of insurance is 
greater than the basis, that’s casualty gain. If the amount of insurance 
is less than the economic loss, then there is some casualty loss (but not 
the full amount of economic loss, because it’s offset by the insurance 
received). But what happens if the insurance is less than the basis but 
greater than the economic loss? There should not be any casualty gain, 
because there’s gain recognized only if the amount received exceeds 
basis.52 But neither should there be any casualty loss, because the lost 
amount is effectively disallowed loss. And why is this “loss” 
disallowed? Because that portion of the value was not destroyed by the 
casualty. 
 
To summarize, some of the questions listed above are answered 
directly by the statute or by regulations, and others are not. 
 
 
 
The questions can be further divided into those questions that can be 
resolved by the form structure, and those that cannot. 
 
 
 
 
52 It might still be correct to include the overinsurance amount as income, but not as casualty 
gain. Thanks to Professor Larry Zelenak, at Duke Law, for this point. 
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Some of these questions will be resolved by the structure of Form 
4684,53 but some cannot be.  
 
b. Form 4684: Casualties and Thefts 
 
Form 4684 addresses casualty and theft losses for individuals. The 
form condenses a large amount of law. The only inputs on Form 4684 
are, for each destroyed or damaged property, (1) a description of the 
property, (2) the cost or basis of the property, (3) insurance, if any, for 
the property, (4) the property’s fair market value before the casualty, 
and (5) the property’s fair market value after the casualty.54 This 
information takes up five lines for each property. Yet the form itself is 
18 lines long. Thirteen lines are thus outputs. Divide these into 
‘interim outputs,’ which feed into other lines on the same form, and 
‘final outputs,’ which feed into other forms. Form 4684 has 11 interim 
outputs; one either interim output or final output (line 15); and one 
final output (line 18). 
 
i. Ambiguous Inputs 
What constitutes correct inputs may not be easily resolved. The form 
asks, for example, for the description, basis, and insurance for 
 
 
 
 
53 See infra Appendix B. 
54 There is one more piece of information the form implicitly requires: whether the casualty 
that resulted in the loss was a federally declared disaster. But the form does not explicitly ask 
for this information. 
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“property lost or damaged from the same casualty or theft” to be 
grouped on different forms. This raises a number of questions, none of 
which can be answered by the structure of the form. 
 
Consider the definition of ‘casualty.’ A “personal casualty loss” is, as 
described in Section 165(c)(3), a loss “aris[ing] from fire, storm, 
shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.” The statute does not 
further define casualty for these purposes. Whether a loss is due to a 
‘casualty’ isn’t usefully addressed by the way that the statute is 
translated into a form, because it asks about a definition, a concept.  
 
The definition of casualty is addressed in the instructions to the form, 
but not comprehensively. The instructions highlight what are 
presumably some of the more common items that do not constitute 
casualties (misplaced or lost money or property; items that break under 
‘normal conditions’; ‘progressive damage to property’; decline in the 
market value of certain stock55), but don’t claim that this list is 
exhaustive. 
 
Instead, to define the limits of ‘casualty’ one turns to a series of cases. 
For example, the value of a house decreased because a neighboring 
house was the site of a notorious crime. The instructions do not 
address such a situation, at least in part because it’s so uncommon. A 
court held that this decline in value did not constitute a casualty loss.56 
Courts use canons of statutory interpretation to analyze this question. 
A court reasons, for example, that the term “casualty” must be 
interpreted in pari materia with the other items on the list—fire, storm, 
shipwreck, and so forth—and these items all involve physical damage 
or loss, so a casualty must involve physical damage or loss.57 All of 
these events are “sudden, unexpected or unusual.”58 And so forth.  
 
 
 
 
 
55 I.R.S., Dep’t of the Treasury, CAT. NO. 12998Z, 2018 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 4684, 2 
(2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i4684.pdf.      
56 Caan v. United States, 83 A.F.T.R.2d 99-1640, 99-1641 (C.D. Cal. 1999).      
57 E.g., Adams v. Comm’r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1219 (1977); Pulvers v. Comm’r, 407 F.2d 838, 
839 (9th Cir. 1969). 
58 Matheson v. Comm’r, 54 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir. 1931). 
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A ‘big data’ approach could provide some guidance with respect to 
this question. A computer could look at all of the cases that address the 
question of what constitutes a casualty and predict whether the current 
situation is sufficient like those cases to quality as a casualty. A tax 
preparation program could use such an approach to determine what 
questions to ask the taxpayer and could guide the taxpayer as to 
whether certain losses would qualify as casualty losses.59 
 
The question of what constitutes a casualty could also be resolved by a 
rule. For example, the rule could be that a ‘casualty’ for purposes of 
Section 165(c)(3) is anything that is a federally declared disaster. (This 
is not the current law; it’s simply an example.) This is trivially 
resolvable by a computer—it could just check to see whether the 
casualty described was on the list of federally declared disaster.  
 
ii. Implementing Law Through Form Structure 
 
Other portions of the law are implemented through the structure of the 
form itself. The portion of the form for personal use property has 18 
lines and only four inputs for each piece of property (and only three 
inputs that are used in the rest of the form, as if the inputs are simply a 
description of the property). From one view, this is a long form for so 
few inputs. But from another view, given that it implements, without 
simplifying, the statute and regulations, it is extraordinarily concise. It 
incorporates answers to all the questions described in Section A above, 
primarily through ordering of calculations.  
 
Not all rules are implemented by ordering, of course. The form 
implements the regulation’s rule to determine the amount of economic 
loss directly. The taxpayer is instructed to enter the basis of the 
property (line 2) and then calculate the difference between the fair 
market value before and the fair market value after the casualty (line 
7), and then to enter the smaller of the two (line 8). This is the casualty 
loss. 
 
 
 
 
59 Blue J Legal, for example, uses “deep learning” to answer the question of whether a worker 
is better classified as an independent contractor or an employee—a distinction that is 
classically not determined by a clear rule. BLUE J. LEGAL: TAX FORESIGHT, 
http://www.bluejlegal.com/tax-foresight [https://perma.cc/92WP-L75A].     
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But many of the more complicated rules are implemented through 
ordering. Consistent with the statute, the form permits casualty loss to 
offset casualty gain dollar for dollar by reducing casualty gain by 
casualty loss (line 15) and only then reducing the amount of casualty 
loss by 10% of AGI (lines 16 through 18). And it permits the 
deduction of casualty loss to the extent of casualty gain above the line 
by instructing the taxpayer to enter casualty gain reduced by casualty 
loss on Schedule D, the schedule for Capital Gains and Losses (line 
15). (Notice as well that the form thus implements the rule that if 
personal casualty gains exceed personal casualty loss, such gains and 
losses are treated as capital gains and losses.)60 It is only casualty 
losses in excess of casualty gains that will be entered on Schedule A, 
itemized deductions (line 18). 
 
These answers are, as discussed above, absolutely clear in the statute, 
either explicitly or implicitly. The taxpayer may not understand that by 
filling out the lines in the particular order requested he is 
implementing these particular rules, but that seems unimportant, since 
they are absolutely the law.  
 
Moreover, if the taxpayer does understand the effect of the ordering, 
the law may be clearer on the form than in the text. Take the rule that 
the $100 haircut applies even if gains are greater than losses. Recall 
that this was implicit in the statute, not explicit, and someone reading 
the statute once or twice might still not understand after reading the 
statute whether the $100 haircut truly acts as a deductible or reduces 
only losses after the losses are netted against the gain. Someone who 
understands the form will have no doubt about the answer to this 
question (or at least about the IRS’s approach to this question); the 
form makes it absolutely clear. 
 
Additionally, even someone who doesn’t understand what the form is 
doing, if they can frame the question and they trust the form, can 
figure out the answer by running some numbers through the form. If 
they check what happens when there is $90 of casualty gain and $120 
 
 
 
 
60 I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(B) (2017). 
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of casualty loss, they will know that the $100 haircut reduces losses 
before losses offset gains. 
 
These are advantages of having law digested into a form: some rules 
are clearer to someone who understands the form, and the rule can be 
checked even by someone who does not understand the form. Forms 
are helpful, then, if the law is absolutely settled, but is complex in its 
presentation. 
 
c. Resolving Ambiguity Through Form Structure 
 
But what if the law is not absolutely settled and clear? That is, what if 
there is an ambiguity in the law? Some ambiguities, as discussed 
above, must be resolved prior to determining inputs. But some 
ambiguities in the law can be resolved through the structure of the 
form itself. And this presents concerns. 
 
Once the taxpayer has determined what numbers to enter onto the 
form, there is no discretion involved in filling out the form. The 
outputs are automatic, as it were. This is why tax forms, as discussed, 
are so amenable to being put on a computer. Thus, if an ambiguity is 
resolved through a form’s structure, a taxpayer who disagrees with the 
form’s resolution of the ambiguity cannot use the form at all.  
 
Additionally, if an ambiguity is not obvious, the form will not reveal 
that an ambiguity exists. The taxpayer must understand the meaning of 
‘casualty loss’ before he can create the inputs for the form. But once 
those inputs are created, the form no longer reveals any ambiguity. 
Because over 90% of tax returns are prepared using computer,61 the 
extent to which the law is implemented via the algorithm of the form is 
even less transparent than was before computer preparation became 
the predominant approach to tax returns. A computer program asks for 
 
 
 
 
61 In 2017, 131,663,509 individual tax returns were filed electronically; 18,202,777 individual 
tax returns were filed on paper, but of those, 7,739,356 were computer generated. I.R.S., 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION 6187: CALENDAR YEAR PROJECTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL 
RETURNS BY MAJOR PROCESSING CATEGORIES 5 tbl.1A (Rev. 10–2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p6187--2018.pdf. Thus, slightly over 93% of returns, at 
least, were prepared by computer. 
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inputs and provides outputs. The return preparer does not see the 
interim steps. 
 
i. Insurance Between Basis and Economic Loss 
 
Consider, for example, the question described above: what is the result 
with respect to casualty gains and losses when insurance received is 
less than the basis of the property but greater than the economic loss 
due to the casualty? As explained above, there is no law on point. 
There is an answer that makes sense, but as any tax lawyer, tax 
professor, or tax student can tell you, that a tax answer “makes sense” 
does not necessarily mean that the answer is correct. ‘Tax logic’ does 
not always do a good job of holding up. One cannot reason one’s way 
to an answer in tax law. 
 
But the tax form absolutely resolves the question, and there is no 
opportunity, once someone is using the form, to come up with any 
other solution.62 
 
Line 4 is casualty gain. This is the excess of insurance received with 
respect to the property (line 3) over the basis of the property (line 2). 
This number will always be positive or zero, because the form itself 
says to skip line 4 if the basis of the property received (line 2) is 
greater than the insurance reimbursement received (line 3). Thus, if the 
basis exceeds the insurance received, there will be no casualty gain. 
If the loss in economic value is less than the basis, then line 8 will be 
the loss in economic value. Line 9 instructs the taxpayer to subtract the 
amount of insurance (line 3) from the loss in economic value (line 8), 
and if the amount is zero or less, to enter zero. That amount equals the 
casualty loss. If the amount of insurance is greater than the loss in 
economic value, the subtraction will result in a number less than zero, 
and the taxpayer will enter zero. So if the insurance is less than the 
basis of the property but greater than the economic loss, there is no 
casualty gain and no casualty loss. 
 
 
 
 
62 To be clear: the form resolves the question of what amount, if any, should constitute 
casualty gain or loss. It does not resolve the question of whether, for example, the 
overinsurance amount should count as income. That question is outside the scope of the form.  
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Now, even though this answer makes sense, it is not anywhere in the 
statute or the regulations. Publications are, as discussed above, not 
binding law. But a taxpayer who uses Form 4684 to report casualty 
gains and losses will follow this rule, perhaps without even realizing it, 
as it’s not addressed in the instructions. And the taxpayer will follow 
the rule because of the way that the form requires the taxpayer to 
combine the various pieces of information the taxpayer enters. 
 
ii. Disallowing Losses from Non-Federally Declared 
Disasters 
 
An example from the 2017 Tax Act is perhaps even more intriguing, 
because it involves not just a question that is unresolved by the statute 
or regulations, but a genuine ambiguity in the statutory text. The 2017 
Tax Act changed the law regarding casualty losses. In addition to the 
other requirements previously laid out in Section 165(h), for the years 
2018 through 2025, only casualty losses due to federally declared 
disasters (“FDD losses”) are deductible, except that casualty losses not 
due to federally declared disasters (“non-FDD losses”) are permitted to 
be used to offset casualty gains.63  
 
Casualty losses that are not due to federally declared disasters are still 
permitted to offset casualty gains. Thus taxpayers use non-FDD 
casualty losses to offset casualty gains, and then use FDD casualty 
losses, to the extent permissible, to offset other gains.  
 
One possible algorithmic approach to implementing the 2017 law is 
something like this: 
 
A. Separate damaged items into casualties. Classify casualties as 
FDD or non-FDD. 
B. Sum all gains from all casualties into a single number (“Total 
Gain”). 
C. For each casualty, sum all losses and reduce by $100 per 
casualty. 
 
 
 
 
63 I.R.C. § 165(h)(5) (2017). 
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D. Sum all FDD casualty losses (after $100 per casualty 
deduction) (“Total FDD”) and, separately, sum all non-FDD 
casualty losses (after $100 per casualty deduction) (“Total non-
FDD”). 
E. Reduce Total Gain by Total non-FDD, but not to less than 
zero. 
F. If any gain remains after reducing Total Gain by Total non-
FDD, reduce that by FDD casualty losses, but not to less than 
zero. 
G. Reduce any remaining FDD casualty losses by 10% of AGI 
(but not to less than zero); this reduced amount may be entered 
into itemized deductions. 
 
For example, assume that there are three casualties, A, B, and C, with the 
following characteristics: 
 
Casualty A B C 
Total Gain $5,000 $2,000 $0 
Total Loss $0 $8,000 $13,000 
FDD Yes Yes No 
 
Each of the losses would get a $100 haircut, resulting in the following 
post-haircut: 
 
Casualty A B C 
Total Gain $5,000 $2,000 $0 
Loss Post-
Haircut 0 $7,900 $12,900 
FDD Yes Yes No 
 
The $12,900 losses of non-FDD losses would be used to offset the 
total gain of $7,700. No FDD losses would be used to offset the gain, 
because there would be more than enough non-FDD losses. The non-
FDD losses would then be thrown out; the FDD losses would be 
reduced by 10% of AGI (let’s say, for purposes of this calculation, that 
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AGI is $5,000, so 10% of AGI is $500), and the remaining losses, 
$7,790 – $500 = $7,740 would be deductible.64 
 
This is the approach described in, for example, the Federal Tax 
Coordinator, a tool for tax practitioners: 
 
[W]here an individual has both personal casualty gains and 
personal casualty losses for a tax year, the individual first 
reduces the amount of personal casualty gains by the amount of 
nonfederal casualty losses. Any remaining personal casualty 
gains are then used to reduce the amount of the taxpayer’s 
deductible federal disaster losses. Any remaining federal 
disaster losses are deductible to the extent they exceed the 
10%-of-AGI floor.65 
 
This is a reasonable approach—perhaps the most reasonable approach. 
(Let’s call it the ‘Standard Reading.’) But the Standard Reading is not 
the only possible reading of the statute. The statute states: 
  
[A]ny personal casualty loss which (but for this paragraph) 
would be deductible in a taxable year beginning after 
December 31, 2017, and before January 1, 2026, shall be 
allowed as a deduction under subsection (a) only to the extent 
it is attributable to a Federally declared disaster (as defined in 
subsection (i)(5)).66 
 
But what “personal casualty loss…(but for this paragraph) would be 
deductible”? Only those losses remaining after the $100 haircut, then 
the netting against gains, and then the 10% of AGI haircut. If this is 
the correct approach, the steps should be as follows: 
 
A. Separate damaged items into casualties. Classify casualties as 
FDD or non-FDD. 
 
 
 
 
64 Feel free to add zeroes to these numbers until you find the discussion interesting. 
65 Personal Casualty Losses of Individuals are Nondeductible for 2018–2025 Unless 
Attributable to a Federally Declared Disaster, Fed. Tax Coordinator 2d (RIA) ¶ M-1900A, 
2018 WL 1616828 (2019).      
66 I.R.C. § 165(h)(5)(A) (2017). 
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B. Sum all gains from all casualties into a single number (‘Total 
Gain’). 
C. For each casualty, sum all losses and reduce by $100 per 
casualty. 
D. Sum all casualty losses (after $100 per casualty deduction) 
(‘Total Losses’). 
E. Reduce Total Gain by Total Losses, but not to less than zero. 
F. If any losses remain, reduce them by 10% of AGI. 
G. Remove any deductible losses not attributable to a federally 
declared disaster. What remains may be entered into itemized 
deductions. 
 
It is not clear what of the remaining would be attributable to a 
federally declared disaster, because it is not clear what losses the 10% 
of AGI haircut reduced. It could have reduced non-FDD losses first, 
FDD losses first, or reduced both proportionately. If it reduced FDD 
losses first, the answer will be the same as that produced by the earlier 
steps. Otherwise, if there are more non-FDD losses than there are total 
gains, the losses deductible will be different with this second approach 
than with the first approach. 
 
For example, with the same numbers above, the total losses are 
$20,800. There are plenty of losses to offset the $7,700 gain, with 
$13,800 of losses remaining. In the absence of 165(h)(5), the total 
deductible losses, after the 10% haircut, would be $13,800 – $500 = 
$13,300. This is permitted “only to the extent it is attributable to a 
Federally declared disaster.” What portion of this is attributable to a 
Federally declared disaster? It depends on what the $500 haircut 
related to the 10% AGI rule reduced. If it reduced FDD losses and 
non-FDD losses proportionately, then the haircut reduced the losses as 
follows: 
 
 
 
So there are $7,761 of deductible losses. 
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If the 10% of AGI haircut reduced FDD losses first, then the answer is 
the same as above: $7,740 of deductible losses. 
 
 
 
If the 10% of AGI haircut reduced non-FDD losses first, then the 
answer is even more favorable to the taxpayer: there are $7,790 of 
deductible losses. 
 
 
 
The most logical answer is that the 10% haircut reduced the losses 
proportionately, but proportionate reduction is always the most 
sensible answer (in my view), and it is not always the result when 
considering how to distribute something among dissimilar items.67 
The larger point is not that the second reading (let’s call it the 
‘Alternate Reading’) is necessarily correct. But it is a plausible reading 
of the 2017 Tax Act, based solely on the law’s text. And no legislative 
history suggests otherwise.  
 
The form for 2018 losses chose the Standard Reading. And this 
decision was implemented structurally, because the difference 
between the readings is the order in which computations are done. The 
2018 Form 4684 itself is almost identical to the 2017 form, except that 
it includes the following language in the line on which the taxpayer is 
to enter aggregate losses: “If you have losses not attributable to a 
federally declared disaster, see the instructions.”68 The instructions 
 
 
 
 
67 For example, in a part gift/part sale, basis is distributed to the gifted portion first. Treas. 
Reg. §§ 1.1001-1(e), 1.1015-4(a). In a like-kind exchange, basis is, essentially, distributed to 
the non-boot items first. In an installment sale, basis is generally distributed proportionately, 
but in certain situations is distributed to debt first. IRC § 1031; Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-2. And 
so on. 
68 I.R.S., Dep’t of the Treasury, Cat. No. 12997O, Form 4684 ¶ 14 (2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f4684--2018.pdf.  
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provide a worksheet, Worksheet 1-1, for people with such losses, and 
the worksheet implicitly enforces the Standard Reading.69 The total 
casualty losses that are permitted to be entered on the form are the sum 
of (a) all non-FDD losses (after the $100 haircut) and (b) the lesser of 
(i) all FDD losses (after the $100 haircut), and (ii) all casualty gains.70 
 
 
 
This is exactly equivalent to the Standard Reading as described 
above,71 but it is more compact. This extreme compactness is typical 
of tax forms.72 The compactness reduces the compliance burden (fewer 
steps to take) but also reduces the chance that the person using the 
form will understand what is happening or why he is being asked to 
 
 
 
 
69 I.R.S., SUPRA NOTE 56, at 5. 
70 Annoyingly, the worksheet does not tell the taxpayer what to do when FDD losses and 
casualty gains are equal—or, to put it in the terms of the worksheet, when line 1 of the 
worksheet equals line 13 of Form 4684. Obviously this does not create a practical problem, 
but technically the worksheet is underspecified. I.R.S., SUPRA NOTE 69, (2018). 
71 See infra Appendix C. 
72 I created my description of the Standard Reading before the actual form instructions were 
issued. While I was able to describe the idea algorithmically, the form writers were able to 
capture the idea much more elegantly. This has been my experience whenever I try to make a 
form for a particular provision before looking at the actual form: I can make one that works, 
but I always end up using more lines than the actual form. 
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take these steps. Indeed, a taxpayer who uses a tax preparation 
program will have no idea that such a decision has been made. The tax 
preparation program asks the taxpayer to input the basis, fair market 
value before, and fair market value after, of each of the properties, and 
to indicate which of the casualty losses were due to a federally 
declared disaster. The taxpayer might then receive the information that 
$7,400 of losses were deductible. (It’s also possible that this would 
simply be incorporated into taxable income and the taxpayer would 
never see this number.) The taxpayer would not know that she had 
casualty gains that were offset by casualty losses. She would have no 
idea where the $7,400 number came from. She would not even know 
that adjusted gross income had anything to do with the $7,400 result, 
because the program would not ask her to input her adjusted gross 
income for this determination (because the program would pull the 
AGI from other information entered). She certainly would have no 
idea that there was another outcome possible under another reading of 
the statute. And a program would have absolutely no chance to work 
in the taxpayer’s favor when implementing the algorithm of the form, 
because to stray from the prescribed algorithm is to enter an answer 
that the IRS will easily be able to pick up as wrong on a simple 
computer review of the taxpayer’s forms.73 
 
Contrast this with the situation in which a taxpayer disagrees, for 
example, with the statement in the form instructions that taxpayers 
cannot deduct “[b]reakage of china, glassware, furniture, and similar 
 
 
 
 
73 It is perhaps worth mentioning the ‘TurboTax Defense’ here. I could find no example of a 
TurboTax defense that involved the claim that the computer program implemented a form 
incorrectly. The original ‘TurboTax Defense,’ raised during the confirmation hearings of 
Timothy Geithner, was that his computer preparation software had failed to prompt him to 
enter particular information. Nomination of Timothy F. Geithner, Hearing Before the S. Comm 
on Fin, 111th Cong. 15 (2009) (“Mr. GEITHNER . . . . I used Turbo Tax to prepare my 
returns. . . . Sen. GRASSLEY. Did the software prompt you to report income and pay self-
employment taxes on your IMF income? Mr. GEITHNER. Not to my recollection, Senator.”). 
One can imagine this as a failure to send the taxpayer along the correct path on a flowchart (an 
incorrect or missing Decision), not as a failure within a calculation (a mistake within a 
Process). Other cases involve mistranscriptions of information into the program or a failure to 
input information accurately, with taxpayers claiming they were justified in thus filing their 
taxes because the software let them do it. For a general discussion of the TurboTax defense, 
see Mock & Shurtz, supra note 10.  
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items under normal conditions.”74 The taxpayer would have inputs into 
the form with which the IRS would disagree, because the taxpayer 
would include amounts as casualty losses that went against the 
definition of casualty loss. But the taxpayer could still use the form, 
and given the taxpayer’s views on the breakage of china, the amount 
of deductible losses would come out correctly. And the program itself 
could work to the taxpayer’s advantage. Depending on the 
sophistication of the program, its questions might be finely tuned 
based on machine learning or other big data analysis to hone in on the 
interpretation of “casualty” that balances favorability to the taxpayer 
with likelihood of triggering an audit, or likelihood that a position 
would be upheld on audit. 
 
IV. Next Steps: Flexible Forms, Coded Law 
 
Given the above discussion, this section suggests how tax forms could 
be improved; why software programs for other areas of law are and 
will remain unlike TurboTax; and possible steps forward in coding law 
itself. 
 
a. Flexible Forms 
 
Imagine a situation in which the IRS was truly not sure how to 
implement a particular statute, and that the different implementations 
had to be played out in the form’s structure, not in inputs. Forms are 
deterministic now, but they don’t have to be. There are alternatives to 
this locked-in approach for questions that must be resolved by form 
structure. There are at least five possible approaches: lock-in, choice, 
probabilistic, expected value, and no form.  
 
First, the IRS could take the traditional approach and lock-in one 
particular reading of the language. The example above of Section 
165(h), for example, locks in the Standard Reading. This approach, as 
discussed above, has some advantages. A lock-in form, like any form, 
makes it easier for a taxpayer to comply with the law as the IRS sees 
 
 
 
 
74 I.R.S., supra note 56, at 2. To be clear, I do not see any legitimate reason to disagree with 
the form’s statement. 
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it. A lock-in form may also make it easier for the taxpayer to 
understand the law, as the taxpayer can try out different numbers to 
see how they affect the bottom line. On the other hand, a lock-in form 
has its disadvantages. It makes any structural resolution of ambiguity 
difficult to detect, and someone who wishes to take a different 
approach cannot use the form at all. But this is not the only possible 
approach to the form.  
 
Second, the form could give the taxpayer a choice, perhaps with 
additional information. For the casualty loss example, the form might 
say, “We believe there is a 60% chance that the correct form reflects 
the Standard Reading, and a 40% chance that the correct form reflects 
the Alternate Reading. Would you like a form that implements (a) the 
Standard Reading or (b) the Alternate Reading?” The taxpayer could 
then select one alternative, and the form would implement whichever 
alternative the taxpayer selected.75 This would essentially provide the 
taxpayer with two forms; he could choose whichever form he 
preferred, and the IRS would know what approach he was taking and 
could audit the form appropriately. 
 
Third, the IRS could create a probabilistic form. Again, for the 
casualty loss example, this form would take into account that the IRS 
thought there was a 60% chance that the correct reading was the 
Standard Reading and a 40% chance that the correct reading was the 
Alternate Reading. The form could provide taxpayers with the 
Standard Reading 60% of the time and the Alternate Reading 40% of 
the time. Again, there would essentially be two forms, but instead of 
letting the taxpayer choose, the taxpayer would be assigned a form. 
The chance of getting each form would depend on a random weighted 
selection. Using the numbers above, the deduction would be $7,400 on 
roughly 60% of returns and $7,614 on roughly 40% of returns. Neither 
position would subject the taxpayer to a penalty. Again, the IRS would 
know what approach the taxpayer had taken. This approach is 
probably not workable, as the IRS would essentially be charging 
 
 
 
 
75 Cf., e.g., EDWARD PACKARD, THE CAVE OF TIME (1979) (choosing your own adventure). The 
choice could also include either or both of the probabilistic and expected value approaches that 
follow. 
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different taxpayers different amounts of tax, which seems potentially 
problematic from an administrative law, or perhaps even a 
constitutional perspective.  
 
Fourth, a form could calculate the expected value of the outcome—
weighting the loss generated by the Standard Reading at 60%, the loss 
generated by the Alternate Reading at 40%, and summing the two. 
Again using the numbers above, the permitted deduction would be 
$7,486.76 While the outcome may be confusing to taxpayers, it’s hard 
to imagine that for most taxpayers the final answer would be any more 
inscrutable than the answer computed strictly under either the Standard 
or Alternative Readings. 
 
Finally, the IRS could issue no form that resolved the question. The 
2018 form could have looked exactly like the 2017 form, and the 
instructions could have included language close to that of the statute—
perhaps the language currently in the instructions, but without the 
worksheet:  
 
For tax years 2018 through 2025, if you are an individual, 
losses of personal-use property from fire, storm, shipwreck, or 
other casualty, or theft are deductible only if the loss is 
attributable to a federally declared disaster. ... An exception to 
the rule limiting the deduction for personal casualty and theft 
losses to federal casualty losses applies where you have 
personal casualty gains to the extent the losses don’t exceed 
your gains.77 
 
This provides the taxpayer with the law, but doesn’t give them the 
algorithm to apply the law. This is perhaps the most problematic 
approach, for a number of reasons. First, even someone who has every 
intent to comply with the law may have a difficult time doing so. A 
taxpayer may want to use the Standard Approach, but may be unable 
to implement it accurately. Second, issuing no form at all does not 
affect all taxpayers equally. A taxpayer who can afford to hire a tax 
 
 
 
 
76 (60% x $7,400) + (40% x $7,614) = $7,486. 
77 I.R.S., supra note 56, at 1-2 (emphasis in original). 
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preparer will be at a distinct advantage. Third, auditing the no-form 
approach will be extremely difficult. Unlike the situation in which the 
IRS has corralled the taxpayer into one of two possible approaches, the 
taxpayer might have taken any approach at all, and might have 
calculated the answer to that approach incorrectly. 
 
b. Turbotax for… Tax 
 
If “TurboTax for X” means more than simply “a computer program to 
help apply the government’s suggested approach to legal issue X,” in 
the United States, at least, for the same reasons tax may be uniquely 
suited to computational law, tax may be uniquely suited for a program 
like TurboTax. TurboTax is useful because it collects information, and 
guides taxpayers through a morass of forms, not all of which apply to 
them, and processes the information it receives. It’s not a wild 
coincidence that TurboTax exists only for tax, as tax law uniquely has 
forms that require extensive78 computational processing of the inputted 
information.79 
 
“TurboTax for police complaints,”80 for example, is a program that 
will “publish a complaint as the subject decides, with non-
governmental actors, the press, or local civil rights attorneys.”81 The 
website describes creating what sounds like a database of police 
complaints that allows “Online Report Filing, Digital Evidence 
Uploading … Department Identification Tools, Publicly Searchable 
Reports, Officers’ Names Made Public, Social Media Sharing … 
Commitment to Open Data.”82 This is entirely unlike TurboTax, 
 
 
 
 
78 From a human perspective. Utterly trivial, from a machine perspective. 
79 The reason for the distinctive nature of tax law deserves more consideration. One possibility 
is that most law in the United States is based on common law, rather than being code based. 
But that explanation does not seem sufficient, as the usefulness and flexibility of forms and 
formalization when it comes to the tax law depends at least in part on the processing the law 
requires. Another possibility relates to the subject of the law. Tax law may be unique in how 
much its subject is numbers, and numbers that may start out loosely tied to the real world but 
that can be subject to endless manipulation that strays far from tracking anything occurring in 
the real world. I am working on an as-yet untitled paper that digs further into this issue. 
80 Conti-Cook, supra note 4, at 18 (describing OpenPolice.org, a “pending” website, as 
“TurboTax for police complaints”). 
81 Id. 
82 OPENPOLICE.ORG, https://openpolice.org [https://perma.cc/QR6G-VRL5].  
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except that it is on line. It does not even appear to apply the law to 
facts; rather, it collects and publishes facts. 
 
The supposed “TurboTax for copyright”83 also appears distinctly 
unlike TurboTax. This program, Durationator, gathers relevant law 
relating to copyright from a range of sources around the world. And 
this program does apply law to facts: it takes facts about a work and 
determines its copyright status in various jurisdictions. But again, it is 
essentially “a big database,”84 in this case of copyright laws. 
 
The purported “TurboTax for immigration”85 is in some ways the most 
like TurboTax of these three examples. This program does not seem 
ever to have launched, but when it was publicized in 2014 and 2015 
the phrase “TurboTax for immigration” turned up repeatedly.86 Similar 
programs do now exist, though. Essentially, these programs help 
individuals understand what forms to file, what information to include 
on the forms, and where to send the forms. Some programs also take 
that information and enter it into the forms, which the applicant can 
then print and mail in.87 (Strikingly, individuals’ immigration forms 
cannot be submitted electronically.)  
 
These programs are similar to TurboTax in that the government has 
created forms that define compliance, and the programs help the 
individual interact with and complete those forms. But immigration 
forms are entirely inputs. The programs guide users through the forms, 
 
 
 
 
83 Laird, supra note 5, at 55, 59 (describing a program, Durationator, that “takes basic 
information about a work and determines its copyright status in any country in the world” and 
“looks like TurboTax for copyright”). 
84 Id. at 56. 
85 Schoon, supra note 6 (“Similar to the consumer-minded TurboTax system, a software style 
often called a ‘wizard,’ Clearpath asks users simple questions online to analyze what they are 
trying to achieve. It then brings up the right immigration forms and inputs users’ answers, with 
the goal of saving time, money, and frustration in the process.”). 
86 E.g., id.; Maria Eugenia Alcon, Clearpath CEO Felice Gorordo Aims to Simplify 
Immigration Applications, NBC NEWS (May 15, 2015, 12:16 PM),  
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/startup-aims-simplify-immigration-applications-
n359266 [https://perma.cc/U9SM-NJVH]. 
87 E.g., FILERIGHT: IMMIGRATION SOLUTIONS, https://www.fileright.com/features 
[https://perma.cc/LSA5-YJ3J] (“Answer simple questions about your life situation, one step at 
a time and FileRight software will complete and properly format the required USCIS 
application documents for you.”).       
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helping them understand which forms to fill out, but there are no 
algorithms and no outputs. One can imagine the immigration programs 
as flowcharts with diamonds (“Decision”) and rhombuses 
(“Input/Output”) but no rectangles (“Process”). In contrast, TurboTax 
not only organizes information and inserts that information into the 
appropriate form, but also transforms the information. This is a 
difference in the nature of the underlying law. 
 
I can think of no other area of law in which the government does or 
could create forms that involve such extensive processing of 
information, though some other forms do contain algorithms. But even 
those forms have a relatively high number of inputs compared to the 
number of implementing algorithms and outputs. The Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines Worksheet A for individual offenders, for 
example, requires five or more inputs and provides a single output, 
which is accomplished merely by summing all previous inputs.88  
 
c. The Future of Computational Law 
 
Because forms implement the law through algorithms, forms can 
provide insight about the future of computational law. 
 
First, just as nobody argues that forms are useless because sometimes 
what constitutes the best inputs are ambiguous, so too arguing that 
formalizing the law is useless because some inputs are ambiguous is 
untenable.89 Simply because a form cannot do everything does not 
mean it cannot do anything; the same is true for codifying the law. One 
can think of forms, and of codified law, as in part guiding the user on a 
path from input-ambiguity to input-ambiguity. The tax law solicits 
inputs and then combines those inputs; each of these steps is 
important.  
 
Second, forms show that formalizations of the law can hew either 
more or less closely to the structure of the language of the law itself. 
 
 
 
 
88 I thank Professor Mark Gergen, at Berkeley Law, for the sentencing form example.  
89 For a more general and extended discussion of formalizing the Code, see Lawsky, supra 
note 24. 
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Each approach has benefits and drawbacks.90 Compare, for example, 
the difficulty of amending the law when it is compacted in the form, as 
opposed to written out in a statute. The new limitation on casualty 
losses was not difficult to add to the statute. The rest of the statute 
remained untouched; all that was required to impose this new 
limitation was to append an additional paragraph to Section 165(h). 
Translating that new language to the form was more difficult than 
adding the language to the statute. If the 2017 law simply stated that 
only casualty losses due to federally declared disasters are deductible, 
no change would have been necessary for the form except to include a 
new element in the definition of “casualty loss.” But casualty losses 
not related to federally declared disasters are still permitted to the 
extent of casualty gain. Thus, the question must be answered by means 
of form structure.  
 
Similarly, creating an algorithm as compact as those on forms requires 
the coder to resolve ambiguities in form structure (such as the 
ambiguity described above that lurks in new Section 165(h)(5)). If a 
coder were tracking the language of the law more closely, he would 
probably end up simply coding the ambiguity. It is not clear whether 
this is an advantage or a disadvantage; it would at any rate permit 
resolution of the ambiguity to be delayed and perhaps to be resolved 
by a court, explicitly, rather than a coder, implicitly. 
 
Finally, understanding how forms work, and that it is very likely that 
forms, and not some more abstract coding of the statutory language, 
underlie tax preparation software, suggests that claims of the 
encroaching dominance of artificial intelligence and the law should be 
viewed with a mix of fondness and skepticism. That a computer does 
something does not mean that artificial intelligence is involved.91 
Computers are excellent at implementing algorithms, but that will 
never put tax lawyers out of work. Tax forms are not “paper 
computers.” They are not flexible; they cannot make leaps of 
inference. On the other hand, a computer that could find novel ways to 
 
 
 
 
90 For further discussion of the usefulness of formalizations that track statutory language, see 
Sarah B. Lawsky, A Logic for Statutes, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 60, 78-79 (2017). 
91 The definition of artificial intelligence is not clear, but whatever it is, it is safe to say that, 
for example, checking a list and finding a matching name is not artificial intelligence. 
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combine rules such that a taxpayer could follow the law and yet 
significantly reduce his taxes would be impressive (and frightening, at 
least for the government). But this would probably require giving the 
computer the entire corpus of the relevant law, as structured, a task 
that at this point, barring significant advances in natural language 
processing, seems difficult if not impossible. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Tax law has a reputation as the one area of law in which computational 
law has had some success. This is true in some sense: compressing tax 
law into algorithms has been an extremely successful pursuit, and one 
that has been critical to effective tax compliance. But these algorithms 
long preceded today’s purported explosion of the field of artificial 
intelligence and the law. Rather, these algorithms have been created 
and implemented by the government since even before the income tax 
was introduced in 1913.92 
 
Once tax forms are understood as brilliant, dense implementation of 
complex law through algorithms, possible improvements for these 
forms become obvious. And while computational law may have great 
potential, a better understanding of what tax preparation software 
actually does can help make expectations for computing and the law 
more realistic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 Indeed, Form 1040, which accompanied the 1913 income tax, is aptly named, as it is the 
1,040th form issued by the Internal Revenue Service! I.R.S., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, IRS 
HISTORICAL FACT BOOK: A CHRONOLOGY 1646-1992, 87 (1993) (“The form was numbered 
1040 in the ordinary stream of numbering forms in sequential order by the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue.”). 
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VI. Appendices 
 
a. Appendix A: Section 165(h) 
 
(h) Treatment Of Casualty Gains And Losses 
(1) Dollar limitation per casualty 
Any loss of an individual described in subsection (c)(3) shall be 
allowed only to the extent that the amount of the loss to such 
individual arising from each casualty, or from each theft, exceeds $500 
($100 for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2009). 
(2) Net casualty loss allowed only to the extent it exceeds 10 percent 
of adjusted gross income 
(A) In general—If the personal casualty losses for any taxable 
year exceed the personal casualty gains for such taxable year, 
such losses shall be allowed for the taxable year only to the 
extent of the sum of— 
(i) the amount of the personal casualty gains for the 
taxable year, plus 
(ii) so much of such excess as exceeds 10 percent of the 
adjusted gross income of the individual. 
(B) Special rule where personal casualty gains exceed personal 
casualty losses—If the personal casualty gains for any taxable 
year exceed the personal casualty losses for such taxable 
year— 
(i) all such gains shall be treated as gains from sales or 
exchanges of capital assets, and 
(ii) all such losses shall be treated as losses from sales 
or exchanges of capital assets. 
(3) Definitions of personal casualty gain and personal casualty loss—
For purposes of this subsection— 
(A) Personal casualty gain 
The term “personal casualty gain” means the recognized gain 
from any involuntary conversion of property which is 
described in subsection (c)(3) arising from fire, storm, 
shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft. 
(B) Personal casualty loss 
The term “personal casualty loss” means any loss described in 
subsection (c)(3). For purposes of paragraph (2), the amount of 
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any personal casualty loss shall be determined after the 
application of paragraph (1). 
(4) Special rules 
(A) Personal casualty losses allowable in computing adjusted 
gross income to the extent of personal casualty gains 
In any case to which paragraph (2)(A) applies, the deduction 
for personal casualty losses for any taxable year shall be treated 
as a deduction allowable in computing adjusted gross income 
to the extent such losses do not exceed the personal casualty 
gains for the taxable year  
… 
(5) Limitation for taxable years 2018 through 2025 
(A) In general 
In the case of an individual, except as provided in 
subparagraph (B), any personal casualty loss which (but for 
this paragraph) would be deductible in a taxable year beginning 
after December 31, 2017, and before January 1, 2026, shall be 
allowed as a deduction under subsection (a) only to the extent 
it is attributable to a Federally declared disaster (as defined in 
subsection (i)(5)). 
(B) Exception related to personal casualty gains—If a taxpayer 
has personal casualty gains for any taxable year to which 
subparagraph (A) applies— 
(i) subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the portion of 
the personal casualty loss not attributable to a Federally 
declared disaster (as so defined) to the extent such loss 
does not exceed such gains, and 
(ii) in applying paragraph (2) for purposes of 
subparagraph (A) to the portion of personal casualty 
loss which is so attributable to such a disaster, the 
amount of personal casualty gains taken into account 
under paragraph (2)(A) shall be reduced by the portion 
of such gains taken into account under clause (i). 
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b. Appendix B: Form 46884 
 
This single page is sufficient if there are personal losses only and only 
a single casualty. 
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c. Appendix C: Form and Standard Reading Equivalence 
 
The Standard Reading requires the following: 
 
A. Separate damaged items into casualties. Classify casualties as 
FDD or non-FDD. 
B. Sum all gains from all casualties into a single number (“Total 
Gain”). 
C. For each casualty, sum all losses and reduce by $100 per 
casualty. 
D. Sum all FDD casualty losses (after $100 per casualty 
deduction) (“Total FDD”) and, separately, sum all non-FDD 
casualty losses (after $100 per casualty deduction) (“Total non-
FDD”). 
E. Reduce Total Gain by Total non-FDD, but not to less than 
zero. 
F. If any gain remains after reducing Total Gain by Total non-
FDD, reduce that by FDD casualty losses, but not to less than 
zero. 
G. Reduce any remaining FDD casualty losses by 10% of AGI 
(but not to less than zero); this reduced amount may be entered 
into itemized deductions. 
 
Consider the only two possible situations: the amount of the Total non-
FDD is greater than or equal to the Total Gain, and the amount of 
Total non-FDD is less than the Total Gain. 
 
If the amount of Total non-FDD is greater than or equal to the Total Gain, 
then the amount of losses that move to the 10% AGI Haircut stage 
equals the amount of Total Gain (because non-FDD losses can be used 
to offset all of the Total Gain), plus the Total FDD. So, in other words, 
when Total non-FDD ≥ Total Gain, the losses that can be used equal 
Total FDD + Total Gain. 
 
If the amount of Total non-FDD is less than the Total Gain, then the 
amount of losses that move to the 10% AGI Haircut stages equals 
Total non-FDD (because all of the Total non-FDD can be used against 
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Total Gain), and then all of the Total FDD (some of which will be 
used to offset Total Gain, and some of which will be moved to the 
10% AGI Haircut Stage and perhaps eventually used to offset non-
casualty gains or other income). So, in other words, when Total Gain > 
Total non-FDD, the losses that can be used equal Total FDD + Total 
non-FDD. 
 
To summarize, the total losses that can be used equal Total FDD + the 
lesser of Total non-FDD and Total Gain. And this is exactly what the 
form worksheet calls for.  
 
 
 
 
Line 1 calls for “the amounts from Line 12 of all Forms 4684 reporting 
losses not attributable to a federally declared disaster.” Line 12 on the 
Form 4684 is casualty loss, reduced by the $100 haircut. This is 
equivalent to Total non-FDD. Line 2 calls for the Line 12 entries for 
federally declared disasters—that is, Total FDD. Line 3 calls for the 
lesser of Line 1 and Line 13 of the Form 4684. Line 13 of the form is 
the sum of all casualty gains—Total Gain. So Line 3 asks for the lesser 
of Total non-FDD and Total Gain. And Line 4 asks for the sum of 
Line 2 and Line 3, that is: Total FDD + MIN(Total non-FDD, Total 
Gain). 
 
 
